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Abstract
Autonomous systems must respond to large amounts
of streaming information. They also must comply with
critical properties to maintain behavior guarantees.
Compliance is especially important when a system selfadapts to perform a repair, improve performance, or
modify decisions. There remain significant challenges
assessing the risk of adaptations that are dynamically
configured at runtime with respect to critical property
compliance. Assuming compliance verification was
performed for the originally deployed system, the proof
process holds valuable meta-data about the variables
and conditions that impact reusing the proof on the
adapted system. We express this meta-data as a
verification workflow using Colored Petri Nets. As
dynamic adaptations are configured, the Petri Nets
produce alert tokens suggesting the potential proof
reuse impact of an adaptation. Alert tokens hold risk
values for use in a utility function to determine the least
risky adaptations. We illustrate the modeling and risk
assessment using a case study.

1. Introduction
As autonomous systems proliferate in all domains of
use, they must become more self-adaptive to hone their
decision-making performance and accuracy while
accepting continuous data inputs. Self-adaptation
requires a methodology to configure adaptive plans that
can produce the desired changes. The MAPE-K loop
(Monitor-Analyze-Plan-Execute with Knowledge) has
been proffered as the standard for self-adaptation of
autonomic processes [10], and therefore, has been
extensively studied [2, 4, 5, 7]. There remain significant
challenges in the risk assessment of adaptations that are
configured dynamically at runtime during the planning
portion of the MAPE-K loop with respect to the
system’s safety and security properties. Such properties
are targeted for compliance guarantees by the deployed
system and, if critical, are formally verified or certified.
The difficulties of risk assessment are inversely related
to the amount of pre-knowledge the autonomous system
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50594
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Rose F. Gamble
University of Tulsa
gamble@utulsa.edu

has of the adaptations it can perform. When arbitrary or
unanticipated adaptations are possible at runtime,
assessing the risk of compliance of the adaptations with
critical properties becomes quite challenging.
If adaptive plans are configured at runtime with
minimal restrictions on what changes are allowed, then
they will not have been vetted during the design of the
system. In this paper, we examine a risk-based
evaluation strategy to compare adaptive plans
configured by a self-adaptive system. The assumption is
that there is little prior knowledge of the overall effect
the adaptive plans will have on the system execution.
The risk strategy focuses on the likelihood that the
changes caused by the adaptive plan will affect the
reusability of the original requirement compliance
verification processes, such as formal proofs or
validation and certification methods. In contrast to
runtime verification, our approach abstracts and models
artifacts of verification processes, such as the state
variables, conditions, and dependencies that are used to
prove requirements compliance prior to deployment.
The premise is that the stronger the restriction on
verification process reuse, the higher the likelihood that
the adaptive plan will cause a requirement violation.
By transitioning the runtime reverification burden of
the adaptive system to determining the risk of
verification process reuse, runtime risk assessment
becomes an option for a broad set of possible
adaptations. In addition, when human analysis of the
autonomous system is performed, the impact of adaptive
plans on reverification or recertification is immediately
known, along with where the impact occurred in the
code.
In this paper, we focus on assessing the risk of
verification process reuse given a requirement and its
compliance proof. The risk is represented using
probability estimates, from which we compute the
expected utility of each adaptive plan with respect to
verification process reuse to identify the least risky selfadaptation. Probability estimates are calculated based
on verification concerns elevated from the original
proof process, along with their impact on the proofs and
knowledge supplied by the MAPE-K planner. We
illustrate the utility calculations using a case study.
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2. Background
Self-adaptive systems have proliferated and
improved over the past decades, but verification and
certification of the adaptive properties remains a
challenge. Villegas, et al. [20] survey self-adaptive
systems and adaptation properties derived from control
theory. The framework proposed evaluates self-adaptive
systems, where adaptation properties are specified
explicitly and driven by quality attributes. Aspects of the
framework include dimensions to classify systems,
adaptation properties, mappings between adaptation
properties and quality attributes, and a set of quality
metrics to evaluate the adaptation properties. The
framework provides an approach to measure adaptation
properties and then classify them according to where
and how their properties are observed.
The FeatUre-oriented Self-adaptatION (FUSION)
framework proposes to measure the impact of
adaptation design [8]. This approach evaluates the
quality of an adaptive plan by learning the impact of
adaptation decisions on the system’s goals. The
framework performs fine-tuning of the adaptation logic
to unanticipated conditions, reducing the upfront effort
required for building such systems and making the runtime analysis more efficient. FUSION learns and adapts
in terms of features and can learn runtime behavior
which is not considered at design time, but it does not
verify that an adaptive plan complies with expected
behavior.
A risk-based adaptive security framework is
proposed in [1] for IoT in eHealth, which can estimate
and predict risk damages and future benefits using game
theory and context-awareness techniques. The
framework consists of an adaptive risk management
model, an adaptive monitoring model, analytics and
predictive models, adaptive decision-making models,
and evaluation and validation models. The adaptive risk
management (ARM) model coordinates the adaptive
monitoring, analytics and predictive models, adaptive
decision-making models, and evaluation and validation
models into a continuous cycle. ARM can learn, adapt,
prevent, identify, and respond to known and unknown
security threats in real-time and can develop risk-based
adaptive security mechanisms. However, the
demonstration of the technology appears to currently be
limited to minor threats and changes.
In [19], a runtime verification framework is
proposed for evaluating and validating self-adaptive
behavior to guarantee compliance with security
properties. The framework integrates runtime
verification enablers into the feedback adaptation loop
of the ASSET adaptive security framework. The
framework needs four enablers: models at runtime,
requirements at runtime, dynamic context monitoring,

and a runtime verification. The claim is that these
enablers allow for runtime verification of the outputs
from feedback control loops for the validation of
adaptive plans before instrumenting them, and include
relevant mechanisms to keep track of the validation
aspects. The resulting construct and integrated use of the
enablers is not well-defined nor demonstrated.
Integrated model-based development and formal
verification for self-adaptive systems could prove to be
a more effective approach to verify an adaptive plan, but
would still require a mechanism to compare plans
should none be completely verifiable. In [18], an
approach is described for an automatic slicing technique
of models with respect to the properties to be verified.
The modeling concepts incorporate a formal semantics
and create an intermediate modeling layer on which to
describe the system properties. This intermediate layer
is then “sliced” to reduce the size of the models so that
automatic verification can be applied. The models are
then composed, retaining their verification status, to the
original and more complex system models.

3. Creating Verification Workflows
Critical requirements, especially those that relate to
the system architecture and expected operating
environment, would be targeted for formal verification,
including proof and model checking, or certification
with some level of risk to ensure the safety and security
of the system prior to its deployment. We use the term
verification process to encompass the various strategies
used to determine the system’s compliance with critical
requirements. When an autonomous system self-adapts
by inserting new functionality, modifying functionality,
or modifying state variables, the resulting change, called
the adaptive plan, should fall within a risk tolerance
threshold for compliance with critical requirements or
provide notifications as to the extent and risk of
compliance failure.
Performing runtime reverification or recertification
of information system compliance in order to deploy an
adaptive plan is not currently a viable solution due to the
problems with those techniques [3,15]. Our approach
seeks to determine the probability of reusing the original
verification processes on the adapted system, such as the
proof, validation, and/or certification processes, that
were originally performed (and documented) to
guarantee requirements’ compliance. The premise is
that a low probability of verification process reuse
corresponds to a greater likelihood of a requirement
violation. Verification process reuse can be inhibited if
a state, condition, and/or control flow relied on by the
original verification process has been altered by the
adaptation. Thus, if multiple, comparable, adaptive
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plans can be dynamically configured, the best plan to
emerge would be the one with the highest probability of
verification process reuse and, thus, a greater likelihood
of compliance.
In this section, we formulate a verification workflow
(VFlow) as the model of a verification process using a
Colored Petri Net (CPN). The CPN provides input to a
utility function (discussed in Section 4) that determines
the risk of deploying an adaptive plan based on
assessing the plan for verification process reuse. A
VFlow is constructed for each requirement that has an
associated verification process.

3.1. Verification Concerns
We derive verification concerns from meta-data
associated with the verification process for each critical
requirement. This meta-data indicates state variables,
conditions, functions, methods, and components that
play a role in the original verification process.
Verification concerns may be derived from component
interfaces (provides/requires) [9], the pre- and
postconditions of Hoare triples to express safety and
progress requirements [11], and state variables within
test scenarios, such as those used for security control
implementation and assessment [16].
As a simple example, a requirement may be
expressed as a safety or progress property. One type of
safety property is an invariant. To prove that properties
A and B are invariant, as written in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) [14] below,
□ (A ∧ B)
it must be the case that the properties expressed by A
and B hold in all reachable states. That can be restated
in terms of Hoare triples, as many researchers use to
express proofs and the potential for proof reuse [6].
[∀s ∈ F | { A ∧ B } s { A ∧ B }]
means that for all statements s in program F, A and B
must be preserved by the execution of s. This
immediately makes A and B verification concerns.
Sometimes, other state variables may affect A or B,
either by being embedded into a condition that may
cause them to be false or by having a side effect that can
impact their state change. Assume that during the
verification process, it is determined that
C⇒A
Then the state of C may impact the state of A. Thus, C
becomes a verification concern.
Progress property proofs can follow a similar
verification process to safety property proofs, except
that progress properties, as temporal properties, cross

states and, therefore, dependencies must be captured
that exist between verification concerns. For example,
the following progress property written in LTL,
□ (D ⇒ ○(D ∧ K))
means that if D becomes true in some state, then in the
next state (D ∧ K) will be true. This property can be
stated in terms of Hoare triples, such as
[∀s ∈ F | { D } s { D ∧ K }]
which clarifies that in a state when D holds, the next
state will have D and K both true, since all statements
must ensure this is the case.
With progress properties, the verification concerns
still reflect the conditions expressed in the Hoare triples,
making both D and K verification concerns. Other
properties may need to hold to ensure that none of the
statements that can execute inhibit K from being true or
change D to false in the next state after D becomes true,
establishing a dependency between the states. These
properties are expressed as lemmas with their own
proofs that may produce additional verification
concerns. Often functions are assumed to be atomic,
meaning they cannot be interrupted. Thus, a statement
in F may be a function G. When proving a property, it
may be necessary to examine the functions that G
comprises resulting in an examination of intermediate
(internal) state changes. For example, assume that G =
(g ° f) and the following statements for f and g can be
proven.
[∀t ∈ f | { D } t { J }]
[∀w ∈ g | { J } w { D ∧ K }]
Since the next complete state change occurs after G, the
progress property is not violated. But if an adaptive plan
did not abide by the atomicity assumptions, then the
intermediate state transition could be problematic.
Therefore, properties, such as J above, are also captured
as verification concerns. In the case study described in
Section 5, we have proven the requirements against Java
code and extracted the verification concerns from those
proofs, as detailed in [11].

3.2. Organizing the Verification Workflow
Each verified requirement has a related VFlow that
models the verification process using the following
information:
• Verification concerns as derived from the
verification process.
• Where, in the system architecture, the verification
concerns were of interest, which may involve
multiple components and functions.

Page 5636

•

Conditions related to the impact or prominence of
verification concerns in the verification process.
These conditions describe change types or ranges
that fall in one of three sets related to expected
impact: devastating, worrisome, or unconcerned.

The system architecture, as part of the VFlow
construction, underlies the verification process and selfadaptive system [17]. Components are generally
examined independently for compliance and, then, as
part of the larger system architecture through their
interfaces. Within the components are the state
variables, functions, and dependencies that the
verification process must also examine, in the form of
lemma proofs [11]. Thus, the VFlow should represent
the proper granularity of the architecture description
that best fits the verification process perspective and
flow.

3.3. Constructing the Colored Petri Net
A Petri Net is a bipartite graph that makes available
mathematical analyses and decision processes to a wide
range of applications by allowing the expression of
system functionalities and architectures. Colored Petri
Nets (CPNs) introduce additional functionality through
distinguishing features among tokens traversing the
network and complex processing by the transitions that
dictate token paths. CPNs have been successfully
applied to modeling scenarios in such areas as
distributed decision making, attack modeling, access
control policies, web service composition, process
control, and the software development process [12, 13].
Reachability, conflict detection, deadlock detection, and
quality of service are a few of the major properties that
CPNs can assess. Their flexibility in modeling
architectures and component processing, along with the
availability of automated tools to simulate them, make
them an appropriate representation for VFlows used to
assess the risk of an adaptive plan.
The current representation of a VFlow models the
major components important to the verification
processes as places in the CPN. A generic VFlow is
shown in Figure 1. Tokens traverse the places using
transitions. In a CPN, transitions can perform complex
processing based on embedded, immutable data
structures.

Figure 1. Generic VFlow represented as a CPN
There are three token colors used in the VFlow. Pink
tokens hold the adaptive plan’s change set. The planning
portion of the MAPE-K loop formulates and configures
potential plans to be risk-assessed. The assumption is
that the change sets embody information related to (1)
what parameters are changed, (2) how, in general, they
are changed, (3) what major components are affected,
and (4) what the planner believes the impact of that
change to be overall. The change impact can be
determined by the planner based on accumulated
knowledge through techniques such as reasoning over
the success or failure history of changes, machine
learning outcomes based on adaptive plans shared
across related information systems, and partial plan
simulations. More details on the calculation of the
change impact are given in Sections 4 and 5. The
structure of the pink token appears below where each
element of the change set has a unique ID, the
verification concern affected (VC), the type of effect to
the verification concern (condition), and its plannercalculated change impact (𝑝̂ ).
tpink = ((ID1, VC1, condition1, 𝑝̂ 1), …,
(IDn, VCn, conditionn, 𝑝̂ n))

The blue token traverses the CPN looking for
verification concerns in the verification process that
may be affected by the change set. These are called
conflicts. This token holds the outcomes from affected
verification concerns as well as change sets provided by
pink tokens. Thus, checks against verification concerns
can be performed at all places in the CPN, regardless of
where the pink token designates the change will occur.
As seen below, the blue token tracks the places traversed
(visited) so that it ensures that every verification
concern in the change set is examined at every place.
The tracking also determines when the blue token’s
cycle is complete and it can be absorbed to terminate the
CPN.
tblue = (visited, vcMatches, vcConflicts,
dependencies, conflictCount, tokenCount)
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The set vcMatches in the blue token accumulates the
conflicts found as a set of tuples of the form (IDconflict,
vcInfo, conflictPlace, 𝑝̂ ). IDconflict is a unique identifier
of the conflict based on the blue token’s conflictCount.
This identifier is used for the alert and may be repeated
across alerts if more than one place is affected. vcInfo
holds a record of the verification concern affected and
the impact determined by the transition based on the
change set’s condition for that verification concern.
Thus, vcInfo embodies the VFlow’s impact indicator
which may be different from the change set’s impact
indicator, 𝑝̂ . The conflictPlace is where the conflict was
found. Each conflict in vcMatches will be at a unique
place because a verification concern can only appear
once at a place. If any change to a verification concern
can strongly impact the risk of reusing the verification
process for the requirement, it will be reflected in the
impact indicator in vcInfo.
The set vcConflicts in the blue token holds the pink
token’s information for comparison with information at
each place in the VFlow as the blue token traverses the
CPN. As discussed in Section 3.1, progress properties
embody dependencies among state variables. These are
captured in the blue token’s dependencies set, which
allows the blue token to manage the dependencies by
enforcing a check on the impact of a verification
concern at a place before or after a conflict was already
found with its dependent verification concern. The
conflictCount generates the unique ID for each pink
token information, while the tokenCount generates a
unique ID per red token.
Red tokens are output by transitions to represent
alerts. These alerts indicate potential conflicts between
the adaptation’s change set and the requirement’s
original verification process. The structure of a red
token is as follows.
tred = (ID, IDconflict, vcInfo, 𝑝̂ , conflictPlace, placeStatus)

The red token ID and IDconflict are assigned by the
blue token prior to the red token being sent to the end
state. The red token must hold all of the factors needed
for the risk assessment of the adaptive plan for that
VFlow. The set vcInfo contains tuples of the form (VC,
vcImpact), so that the transitions’ impact factor based
on the pink token’s change set condition is recorded.
The pink token’s 𝑝̂ value is also maintained in the red
token along with the place where the conflict occurred
and the weight of that place’s importance to the
verification process.
An example transition appears as pseudo code
below. This is one of 18 transition rules used in a VFlow
based on our modeling of verification processes for
safety and progress properties. Transitions always
require a blue token and a pink token as input. In this
example, the blue token, B, has not visited the input

place to the transition. The transition, T, does not have
a verification concern (VC) that conflicts with what the
blue token has accumulated in B.vcConflicts. The
transition does have a conflict with a VC in the pink
token P’s change set.
Transition Conditions:
T.place_name is not in B.visited
No VC in T.vcInfo appears in B.vcConflicts
A VC in P conflicts with a VC in T.vcInfo
Transition Actions:
FORALL VC in T.vcInfo that appear in P
Increase B.count and B.IDconflict
Create a red token, R, with B.count as its ID,
B.IDconflict as its IDconflict, and other
information held by P and T
Update B.vcMatches to include IDconflict and
the appropriate information held by T
for all matching VCs
Add the appropriate change information
from P to B.vcConflicts using
B.count for IDconflict
FORALL VC in P that are not in T.vcInfo
Increase B.count and B. IDconflict
Add the appropriate change information from P
to B.vcConflicts using B.count for
IDconflict
Add T.placeName to B.visited
Send B to output place
Send P to its place of origin
Send all red tokens to end place

4. Evaluating Risk
For each requirement 𝑟 and adaptation plan 𝑎, the
VFlow outputs a set of red tokens 𝑇(𝑟, 𝑎) representing
alerts. Once the red tokens are generated, the system
calculates a metric that can be used to compare the risks
of adaptation plans based on the token information. To
obtain a workable formula, we assume that each red
token, independently of all other tokens, has the
potential to represent an actual violation of verification
process reuse. That is, the adaptive plan has altered
something that was relied on by the original proof of the
requirement. We also assume that verification process
reuse is violated if and only if there is at least one red
token representing an actual impact. (Our current work
ignores the possibility that a group of red tokens might
represent the violation in combination, without doing so
individually.) For each red token 𝑡, let 𝑆(𝑡) be an
indicator variable with value 0 if 𝑡 represents an actual
violation and 1 otherwise. For each requirement 𝑟 and
adaptation plan 𝑎, let 𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) be an indicator with value
0 if 𝑎 violates the reuse of 𝑟’s proof and 1 otherwise.
Although the values of 𝑆(𝑡) and 𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) would typically
be deterministic, we assume they are infeasible to
compute, and therefore model 𝑆(𝑡) and 𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) as
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random variables. Our assumptions given above
translate to the following statements.
For each requirement 𝑟 and plan 𝑎,
𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) = 0 ⇔ (∃ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇(𝑟, 𝑎))(𝑆(𝑡) = 0).
For each requirement 𝑟 and plan 𝑎, the random
variables in the set
⋃ {𝑆(𝑡)}
𝑡∈𝑇(𝑟,𝑎)

are mutually independent.
From these statements, we deduce that the
probability that plan 𝑎 does not violate the reuse of
requirement 𝑟’s proof is

concerns. A red token 𝑡 contains impact multipliers
𝑀𝑃𝐿 (𝑡) and 𝑀𝑉𝐶 (𝑡), representing the impact of the
architecture
place
and
verification
concern
(respectively) from which the token was generated.
Lower multipliers represent higher impact/risk. We
apply these multipliers to 𝑝̂ (𝑡) to get 𝑝(𝑡), resulting in
an estimate that takes into account the proof
characteristics.
We have considered two possible ways to apply the
multipliers: scaling the probability and scaling the odds.
The latter allows for the possibility of multipliers greater
than 1, which would indicate that the estimate given by
the planner should be increased rather than decreased.
One of the outcomes of this study is a comparison of the
two approaches based on how well they estimate the
relative risk of adaptations.
With probability scaling, we have
𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑀𝑃𝐿 (𝑡)𝑀𝑉𝐶 (𝑡)𝑝̂ (𝑡).

𝑃(𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎) = 1) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑆(𝑡) = 1).
𝑡∈𝑇(𝑟,𝑎)

To compare adaptation plans, we define the
requirement utility of plan 𝑎 to be the weighted sum
𝑈(𝑎) = ∑ 𝑤(𝑟)𝐼(𝑟, 𝑎)

With odds scaling, we have
𝑝(𝑡) =

𝑜(𝑡)
1+𝑜(𝑡)

, where 𝑜(𝑡) =

𝑀𝑃𝐿 (𝑡)𝑀𝑉𝐶 (𝑡)𝑝̂(𝑡)
1−𝑝̂(𝑡)

.

(If 𝑝̂ (𝑡) = 1, this formula is undefined, and we instead
use 𝑝(𝑡) = 1.)

𝑟∈𝑅

where 𝑅 is the set of requirements and 𝑤(𝑟) is a
stakeholder-supplied utility weight for the need to
maintain system compliance with requirement 𝑟. The
expected requirement utility is then as follows.
𝐸[𝑈(𝑎)] = ∑ (𝑤(𝑟) ∏ 𝑃(𝑆(𝑡) = 1))
𝑟∈𝑅

𝑡∈𝑇(𝑟,𝑎)

If the expected requirement utility can be computed,
it can be used as a metric to distinguish riskier plans
from less risky plans. However, this goal requires an
estimate 𝑝(𝑡) ≈ 𝑃(𝑆(𝑡) = 1) for each token 𝑡. Each red
token contains such an estimate 𝑝̂ (𝑡), based on whatever
knowledge the planner may have to compute it. Since
𝑝̂ (𝑡) is presumed to have been computed without
consideration of the characteristics of the original
verification process, we wish to adjust it based on proofrelated information to get the final estimate 𝑝(𝑡).
Our approach to computing 𝑝(𝑡) is based on the idea
that verification concerns and architectural places can
have differing levels of prominence or impact in a
verification process. We assume that red tokens
generated from a high-impact place or verification
concern are more likely to represent actual reuse
violations than those coming from low-impact places or

5. Case Study
To evaluate our risk comparison methodology, we
apply it to a case study that we have developed
previously, called the Multi-Mode Traveler System
[11]. The case study involves a system on which we
impose multiple self-adaptive plans. As the system is
quite simple, we can manually reason about and
compare the risks of each adaptation. Our goal is to
determine whether the more mechanistic utility
comparison metric described in Section 4 can come to
conclusions similar to those which we have derived
manually, given the original verification processes.
The MMTS consists of a traveler that moves in a grid
while attempting to avoid stationary enemies distributed
randomly on the grid. At each step, the traveler attempts
to choose a new position and move to it. Based on the
direction of the move, the traveler’s fuel level may
increase, decrease, or stay the same when it reaches the
next position. The traveler is given an upper and lower
limit on its fuel value, and must keep the fuel within that
threshold. More complex variants of the system employ
mission planning and enemy avoidance.
The MMTS base code provides an update process
that chooses and sets the new position and fuel value.
We identified three high-level architectural components
that comprise the update process. The first is
Page 5639

getCurrentStatus (gCS), which reads and validates the
state at the start of the update. The second is
getNextPosition (gNP), which determines the set of
valid moves and randomly chooses a move from that set.
The third is setPosition (sP), which moves the traveler
to the chosen position and updates its fuel level. These
three components form the architectural places in the
VFlow for the two of the MMTS requirements, R1 and
R2, stated in LTL below.
R1: □ (minFuel ≤ fuel ≤ maxFuel)
R2: □ ((canMove ∧ position = p) ⇒ ○notAt(p))
For R1, the fuel level must stay within the threshold
at all times. For R2, if the traveler can move at a given
time step, then it must move. canMove is defined as
validMoves ≠ ∅, where validMoves is computed
according to the current traveler state to exclude
positions containing enemies and moves that would lead
to a fuel threshold violation. A random move from the
validMoves set is chosen in each update. If the set is
empty, the traveler stays in its current position. notAt(p)
is defined as position ≠ p, given p represents the current
position. For the current case study, we assume the
stakeholder-supplied utility weights of the requirements
are 𝑤(R1) = 0.75 and 𝑤(R2) = 1.

In [11], we verified that the MMTS code (without
adaptation) satisfies these requirements and derived the
verification concerns using the process outlined in
Section 3.1. As an outcome of the verification process,
we extract impact multipliers for use in the risk
comparison calculations. These multipliers are based on
the prominence of different verification concerns and
architectural places in requirements’ proofs, as well as
the conditions required by the proofs.
Table 1 shows the place impact multiplier for each
of the 3 architectural places for each requirement. In this
case study, we manually assigned values of 0.2 (high
impact), 0.5 (medium impact), or 0.9 (low impact) based
on our perception of the importance of each place in
each proof. These values and others described in this
section are shown in the example VFlow for R1 in
Figure 2.
Table 1. Impact multiplier for the
VFlow place if a change occurs
R1
R2

gCS
0.9
0.5

gNP
0.5
0.5

sP
0.2
0.2

Figure 2. VFlow for R1 with the change set from adaptation A1
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Table 2. Verification concern impacts from the VFlow perspective for R1
R1
fuel

devastating
Change greater than or equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙, positive or
negative.

minFuel

Change greater than or equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙, positive.

maxFuel

Change greater than or equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙, negative.

worrisome
Change greater than or equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
, positive or
2
negative.
Change greater than or equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
, positive.
2
Change greater than or equal to
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
, negative.
2

unconcerned
Change less than
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
, positive or
2
negative
Negative change or change
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
less than
.
2
Positive change or change less
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙
than
.
2

Table 3. Verification concern impacts from the VFlow perspective for R2
R2

devastating

worrisome

fuel

Set to 0.

Large change, positive or negative.

minFuel

Set to maxFuel.

maxFuel

Set to 0.

validMoves
nextMove
position

Changed to a nonempty set with no
change in nextMove.
Set to null with no change in
validMoves.
Changed with nextMove set to null.

Increased to a value less than
maxFuel.
Decreased to a value greater than
minFuel.
Changed to a nonempty set with a
change in nextMove.
Set to null with a change in
validMoves.
Maintained with nextMove set to
null.

As discussed previously, the impact multiplier for a
verification concern can depend on the type of change
made. Verification concern impacts are categorized as
devastating, worrisome, or unconcerned, and the
corresponding impact multiplier values are 0.2, 0.5, and
0.9, respectively. Table 2 and Table 3 show the rules that
we used for categorizing the relevant verification
concerns’ impacts for R1 and R2, respectively. The
categorization is based on the type and/or magnitude of
the change, which is supplied by the planner.

5.1. Potential Adaptations
In our example scenario, the MMTS is initialized
with the traveler at position (0,0) with a fuel value of 80,
a lower fuel threshold minFuel = 0, and an upper fuel
threshold maxFuel = 160. The system is simulated for
25 time steps, at which point an engine failure occurs,
triggering the adaptation process. The planner
configures possible adaptation plans and constructs their
change sets to assess the risk of impacting proof reuse
for requirements R1 and R2.
The four adaptation plans we compare are:
A1: maxFuel is divided by 2 within gCS.
A2: maxFuel is reduced by 40, and minFuel is
increased by 40 within gCS.

unconcerned
Small change, positive or
negative.
Set to 0.
Increased.
Set to ∅.
Set to null with validMoves
changed to ∅.
Maintained when validMoves
is empty.

A3: The next move for the traveler is not chosen for
5 time steps within gNP, even if validMoves is
nonempty (to simulate a stop for repair).
A4: validMoves is changed to the empty set for 5 time
steps (to simulate a stop for repair) in gNP.

5.2. Examining Adaptation Plan Risks
By manual analysis and simulation, we have
identified the potential risks of each plan with respect to
the requirements. A1 is risky for R1, as it leads to a
violation if the current fuel value is greater than 80.
When R1 fails, it also causes a failure in R2, because the
traveler stops moving if it detects a violation of the fuel
threshold. Therefore, A1 is also risky for R2. A2 can
also pose a threat to R1 and R2 if the current fuel value
is below 40 or above 120, but that is not possible given
the function for calculating the fuel by the 25th time step
when the adaptation occurs. Therefore, A2 has very
little risk if performed early in the traveler movement.
A3 and A4 both disallow movement for 5 moves,
which poses no threat to R1. A3 is very risky for R2, and
in fact will always cause a violation if the set of valid
moves is nonempty at the time of the adaptation. A4 is
superficially similar to A3, but it actually is not risky for
R2, because R2 only requires movement when the set
validMoves is nonempty.

Page 5641

Based on our analysis, A3 should be considered
risky for R2, while A1 should be considered risky for
R1 and R2. A2 might be considered marginally risky for
R1 and R2, because it could fail under some
circumstances, although those circumstances are not
possible in our simulation. A4 poses no risk for either of
the requirements.
It remains to be shown how the planner generates the
initial success probability estimate 𝑝̂ for each plan’s
pink token(s). In this case study, we assume the planner
knows that reducing the set of valid moves is less risky,
so it uses 𝑝̂ = 0.99 for all of A4’s pink tokens. We
assume the planner has been able to determine that
changing the logic in getNextPosition has some risk to
both requirements, so it uses 𝑝̂ = 0.5 for A3’s pink
tokens.
For A1 and A2, we assumed that the planner might
run predictive simulations involving perturbations of
minFuel or maxFuel, to estimate the sensitivity of the
system to such changes. We performed 200-step
simulations in which either minFuel or maxFuel was
perturbed at the 100th step, with 1000 runs of the
simulation for each perturbation size and requirement.
The simulations produced a success rate of 0.532 for R1
when maxFuel was reduced by 80, meaning 53.2% of
the 1000 simulations found no violation of R1. The
corresponding success rate for R2 was 0.505. Therefore,
we set 𝑝̂ = 0.532 for A1’s pink token in R1’s VFlow,
and 𝑝̂ = 0.505 for the pink token in R2’s VFlow.
In all simulations where minFuel was increased by
40 or maxFuel was decreased by 40, no proof violations
were detected. Assuming the planner would be cautious
enough not to indicate a guaranteed success based on a
simulation, we set 𝑝̂ = 0.99 for all of A2’s pink tokens.

5.3. Computed Results
Table 4 and Table 5 show the success probabilities
computed from the set of red tokens for each
requirement/plan pair, along with the expected utility
based on the probabilities and the requirements’ utility
weights. Table 4 provides the results for the probability
scaling approach. Table 5 shows the odds scaling
results.
Table 4. Results from probability
scaling approach

A1
A2
A3
A4

Results Using Probability Scaling
R1 Success
R2 Success
Expected
Prob.
Prob.
Utility
0.0127
0.00708
0.0166
0.0204
0.00630
0.0216
1
0.0500
0.800
1
0.446
1.20

Table 5. Results from odds scaling approach

A1
A2
A3
A4

Results Using Odds Scaling
R1 Success
R2 Success
Probability
Probability
0.0345
0.0226
0.875
0.858
1
0.0909
1
0.978

Expected
Utility
0.0485
1.51
0.841
1.73

6. Discussion and Conclusion
The risk values calculated using odds scaling match
fairly well with what we would expect based on our
manual reasoning. For R1, A3 and A4 were found to
have no risk, A2 was found to have low risk (high
success probability), and A1 was found to have high
risk. For R2, A1 and A3 were found to have high risk,
while A2 and A4 had low risk. However, there are some
discrepancies from what we would expect. For example,
the success probability computed for R2 was higher for
A3 than for A1, even though A3 nearly always causes a
failure for R2 while A1 causes failures less frequently.
The same issue occurs when probability scaling is used.
An additional problem occurs with probability scaling
in that A2 is found to have the lowest success
probability for R2, even though it is one of the safer
adaptations for that requirement.
Given these discrepancies, we plan to refine our risk
calculations in future work. In particular, we will
attempt to find a way to relax the assumption that all red
tokens affect the requirements independently of each
other. Another important future task will be to formalize
the process of extracting meta-data from a verification
process. Our approach thus far has relied on manual
proofs and manual meta-data extraction. We plan to
develop a methodology for extracting this information
in a way that can be automated in some form.
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